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Abstract 
Over the past 10 years, financial firms have increased the size of their positions in the oil 
futures market. At the same time, oil prices have increased dramatically. The conjunction 
of these developments has led some observers to argue that financial speculation caused 
the run-up in oil prices. Yet several arguments cast doubt on the validity of this claim. 
First, although the stock of open futures contracts is many times larger than the flow of 
oil consumption in the United States, comparing these two statistics is misleading. Stocks 
are not measured with respect to a specific unit of time but flows are, so the two are not 
directly comparable. Second, empirical analysis shows that changes in financial firms’ 
positions do not predict oil-price changes, but that oil-price changes predict changes in 
positions. Third, the evidence indicates that financial firms’ positions did not cause the 
market to expect persistent price increases during 2007/08. Other explanations for the 
increase in oil prices include macroeconomic fundamentals, such as interest rates and 
increased demand from emerging Asia. Of these two explanations, the one that seems 
most consistent with the facts explains oil-price fluctuations in terms of large and 
persistent demand shocks related to growth in global real activity in the presence of 
supply constraints. 
JEL classification: Q41, G12 
Bank classification: International topics 
Résumé 
Au cours des dix dernières années, les sociétés financières ont accru la taille de leurs 
positions sur le marché à terme du pétrole. Parallèlement, les prix du pétrole ont connu 
une augmentation spectaculaire. Cette double évolution a amené certains observateurs à 
postuler que la spéculation financière était à l'origine de l'envolée des prix du produit, 
mais plusieurs arguments jettent le doute sur la validité d'une telle hypothèse. 
Premièrement, bien que le stock de positions ouvertes sur le marché à terme soit 
largement supérieur au flux de consommation de pétrole aux États-Unis, la comparaison 
de ces deux statistiques est trompeuse. Contrairement aux flux, les stocks ne sont pas 
mesurés sur une unité de temps précise, de sorte que les deux ne sont pas directement 
comparables. Deuxièmement, l’analyse empirique montre que les variations des positions 
des sociétés financières ne permettent pas de prévoir celles des prix du pétrole, mais que 
la réciproque est vraie. Troisièmement, les observations indiquent que les positions des 
sociétés financières n’ont pas amené le marché à anticiper des hausses de prix 
persistantes en 2007-2008. Parmi les autres causes possibles de la montée des prix du 
pétrole, on avance les variables macroéconomiques fondamentales, telles que les taux   iv
d’intérêt et la demande accrue des pays émergents d’Asie. Des deux explications, celle 
qui semble cadrer le mieux avec les faits associe les fluctuations des prix du pétrole aux 
chocs de demande importants et persistants liés à l’expansion de l’activité réelle mondiale 
en présence de contraintes de l’offre. 
Classification JEL : Q41, G12 




The increase in the price of crude oil since 2003, its sharp spike at $142 per barrel in July 2008 
and its subsequent collapse in the autumn of 2008 have raised questions about the role of 
financial speculation in determining the price of oil. Attributing these wide fluctuations to 
financial factors is plausible because investors have come to view commodities as a distinct asset 
class. This portfolio shift has led to large financial flows into the oil futures market, as well as 
other commodity futures markets (Bank for International Settlements 2008). Estimates indicate 
that, by June 2008, the total value of commodity index-related trading funds held by institutional 
investors was worth approximately $200 billion, up from about $13 billion at the end of 2003 
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2008; Masters 2008). Also by June 2008, investment 
in NYMEX crude oil ($51 billion) made up about one-third of the total value of commodity 
index investment in U.S. markets (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2008). At the same 
time, the price of oil reached unprecedented heights, increasing from $32 per barrel at the end of 
2003 to $142 in July 2008 (Figure 1). To many observers, the conjunction of these two trends 
suggests a causal connection between financial speculation and the increase in the price of oil. In 
this paper, we examine the evidence for this claim. 
 




Understanding the relationship between financial speculation and oil prices is an important issue 
confronting Canadian policy-makers. Since oil makes up about 35 per cent of Canadian 










2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010






immediate implications for the Canadian economy.
1 Furthermore, the fairly tight and long-
standing relationship between energy prices and the Canadian dollar implies that fluctuations in 
oil prices affect the overall competitiveness of Canadian exports in the rest of the world. Changes 
in the value of the Canadian dollar related to financial speculation in the oil futures market could 
have important effects on the allocation of resources among different sectors of the Canadian 
economy. A sectoral reallocation of capital and labour unrelated to fundamental macroeconomic 
conditions would be inefficient and may call for offsetting macroeconomic policy actions. 
  
We begin by defining the term “financial speculation” in a commodity market and discuss some 
of the issues surrounding how it is used. We then examine the arguments about how the increase 
in the number of financial investors could have led to increases in the price of oil from 2003–08, 
and present evidence on whether changes in financial investors’ positions affected spot prices. 
Three important arguments are that: (i) the growth in the number of open futures positions 
increased oil prices; (ii) the open positions of financial firms caused the increase; and (iii) 
financial firms’ open positions affected market expectations of future spot price increases and, 
hence, distorted the incentive to store oil. Finally, we assess the extent to which macroeconomic 
fundamentals explain the recent run-up in oil prices by considering two prominent explanations: 
(i) persistently low real interest rates, and (ii) rapid increases in the demand for oil driven by 
unexpectedly strong growth in the global economy. Overall, we find that financial speculation 
does not seem to have played an important role in the price run-up. Currently, the available 
evidence supports the view that macroeconomic fundamentals explain the increases in the price 
of oil witnessed during 2007/08. 
 
2  What Is Financial Speculation in Commodity Markets? 
We define “speculation” as a firm holding a net position, either long or short, in the expectation 
of earning a positive return, and not because it is a commercial user of oil (see Working 1960). 
By contrast, we define “hedging” as transacting in a commodity futures market because such 
transactions are tied to a firm’s operations, including processing, merchandising or marketing the 
commodity (see Peck 1985). 
 
These definitions are standard and consistent with those used by regulatory agencies. For 
example, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) makes a distinction between 
“commercial” and “non-commercial” firms, with commercials being considered “hedgers” and 
non-commercials “speculators.” But classifying firms in this way is not completely clear cut, 
because commercials can take speculative positions and non-commercials can hedge exposure to 
                                                            
1 The ratios are based on nominal values for the year 2007. 
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price risk. It is more realistic to think of the behaviour of hedgers and speculators as arrayed 
along a continuum, with some speculating, some hedging and some doing both. 
 
Recognizing the inherent imprecision of these categories, we nevertheless adopt them, for a 
pragmatic reason. The entire debate among policy-makers and academics about speculation in 
the oil futures market has been guided by the proposition that financial firms (i.e., non-
commercials) may have driven oil prices away from the value consistent with economic 
fundamentals (Bank for International Settlements 2008; International Monetary Fund 2006, 
2008; Masters 2008; Hamilton 2009). It is thus natural to examine this specific proposition, 
subject to the caveat that firms’ motives are unobservable. 
  
3  Financial Speculation in the Oil Futures Market 
In this section, we examine three of the main arguments in favour of financial speculation: (i) the 
overall increase in activity in the oil futures market; (ii) the effect of non-commercial firms’ 
positions; and (iii) the effect of non-commercial firms on market expectations. 
 
3.1  Open interest and volume in the oil futures market 
Since the early 2000s, the diffusion of financial instruments based on commodity indexes 
including oil has permitted investors to assume greater exposure to commodity-price risk. The 
promotion of these instruments was motivated by the finding that the returns of commodity 
indexes provided an opportunity for diversification, thereby improving the risk-return trade-off 
(Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006). As a result, open interest and the volume of oil futures 
contracts have increased over the past 10 years. “Open interest” measures the total number of 
futures contracts, either long or short, that have been entered into and that have not yet been 
liquidated by an offsetting transaction or fulfilled by delivery. The volume of futures contracts 
traded is the quantity of contracts that changes hands and measures the level of trading activity. 
Figure 2 shows that the total amount of open interest increased in the first half of 2008, when the 
price of oil reached unprecedented levels. Between January 2003 and June 2008, open interest in 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures contracts more than doubled, from about 600,000 
contracts to about 1.3 million, and as the price collapsed in the wake of the financial crisis, open 










Figure 2. Open Interest and the Spot Price of Oil 
 
                                      Sources: Commodity Futures Trading Commission and NYMEX 
 
These developments have been interpreted by some observers as prima facie evidence for the 
importance of financial speculation in the oil futures market. In particular, it is common to 
compare the amount of open interest in the futures market to U.S. daily consumption and use the 
fact that open interest is many times larger than U.S. daily consumption to infer the presence of 
speculative pressures (Cho 2008; Masters 2008). In addition, Khan (2009) points out that the 
ratio of average daily trading volume to global oil production has grown steadily and that, by late 
2009, this ratio exceeded 15. 
 
Yet these interpretations are misconceived. First, open interest is a stock variable, which is 
measured at a point in time, whereas U.S. daily consumption is a flow variable, measured per 
unit of time, so the two series are not directly comparable.
2 Second, the fact that the volume of 
transactions in the oil futures market is larger than physical production does not take into account 




2 Since a stock is not associated with any specific interval of time and a flow variable is, one can choose an arbitrary 
unit of time over which to measure a flow variable and scale the ratio of open interest to U.S. consumption to be as 
large or small as one likes. For instance, a widely cited Washington Post article (Cho 2008) pointed out that a single 
energy firm took a long futures position in the NYMEX oil futures contract equivalent to about three times U.S. 
daily consumption. This seems large, but it is smaller if we compare the number of notional barrels of oil implied by 
the position to annual U.S. consumption. 
3 Once the maturities of different contracts are reconciled, the volume of futures contracts for delivery in a given 
month was a fraction, rather than a multiple, of global physical production during 2007/08, the period when futures 
contracts were the most heavily traded (Ripple 2008, Table 2). 5 
 
3.2  Non-commercial firms and the price of oil 
The share of non-commercial firms in total open interest on the NYMEX market grew 
dramatically from less than 20 per cent in 2000 to more than 40 per cent in 2008 (Büyükşahin et 
al. 2008). In addition, non-commercial firms as a group have tended to take long positions since 
2000 by buying near-term contracts and rolling them over as the maturity of the contract 
approaches (Figure 3).
4 For these two reasons, some analysts have considered the possibility that 
the increase in oil prices is attributable to the market impact of non-commercial firms (e.g., 
Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets 2008). This hypothesis relies on the premise that 
if a large number of non-commercial firms (such as hedge funds) use positive feedback trading 
rules, they can artificially amplify a market move (Fung and Hsieh 2000). 
 
Figure 3. Non-Commercial Firms’ Positions
 
                      Sources: CFTC and authors’ calculations 
 
We use Working’s T-index to examine the importance of non-commercial firms (Working 1960; 
Till 2009; Sanders, Irwin and Merrin 2010).
5 The index is bounded below by unity, and larger 
values indicate a greater number of open non-commercial positions relative to commercial 
                                                            
4 These positions are measured by netting out the total amount of non-commercial open interest that is short oil 
futures contracts from the total amount of non-commercial open interest that is long oil futures contracts. 
5 The details on the construction of this index are described in the appendix. 6 
 
positions. To the extent that the positions taken by the non-commercial firms do not offset those 
taken by the commercial firms, the size of this imbalance is indicative of speculative positions in 
excess of the requirements of hedgers. As Figure 4 shows, the index increased in 2008 at the 
same time that the price of oil increased so dramatically, but it also reached similar levels in 
2003 and 2005 when oil prices were lower. Moreover, despite record net long non-commercial 
positions at the end of 2010, the T-index suggests that speculative pressures were subdued, given 
the greater hedging demand by commercial firms.  
 
Figure 4. T-Index and the Spot Price of Oil 
 
                                Sources: CFTC and authors’ calculations 
 
If the broader participation of financial investors caused the increase in the price of oil, a 
necessary condition is that changes in financial firms’ positions temporally precede changes in 
the price of oil. To examine this question, as well as the related question of whether changes in 
non-commercial firms’ net open positions caused price changes, we conduct bivariate and 
conditional Granger causality tests (Granger 1969). All of the data come from the CFTC’s 
weekly Commitments of Traders reports that record the positions of commercial and non-
commercial firms.
6 We examine the evidence over the full sample (1993M1–2010M12), as well 
as two subsamples (2003M1–2008M6 and 2003M1–2010M12).
7 
                                                            
6 These data are available at <http://www.cftc.gov/marketreports/commitmentsoftraders/index.htm>. 
7 While, because of data constraints, we cannot directly compare the results of similar tests provided by the 
Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets (2008) report, we are able to mimic closely the results obtained 
with public data reported in the International Monetary Fund’s “World Economic Outlook” (IMF 2006) and “Global 
Financial Stability Report” (IMF 2008). Furthermore, the data used to construct the T-index in Till (2009) begin 
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Table 1 reports the correlations of the changes in positions with changes in oil prices. Both the 
contemporaneous and 1-week-ahead correlations are reported. The table indicates that the net 
long speculative positions are positively but weakly correlated with contemporaneous changes in 
oil prices, and that commercial positions are negatively correlated with price changes, consistent 
with hedging activities of commercial firms in the futures market. These correlations are 
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5 per cent level. These correlations exhibit a 
pattern similar to the contemporaneous correlations and they, too, are statistically significantly 
different from 0 at conventional levels. In addition, the correlations seem higher, but the lack of 
cross-sectional variation does not permit us to conduct a formal test of whether these differences 
are statistically significant. This evidence warrants a more formal examination of the time-series 
relationship between changes in traders’ positions and changes in oil prices. 
  








Changes in non-commercial net positions  t  0.23 0.28    0.21   
t+1  0.36 0.38 0.26 
Changes in commercial positions  t  -0.23 -0.22 -0.16 
t+1  -0.39 -0.41 -0.28 
Note: These are the correlation coefficients of the first differences of the log of oil prices with changes in non-commercial net 
positions and commercial net positions. All the coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
The Granger causality tests reported in Table 2 do not reveal strong evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that changes in non-commercial traders’ positions affected oil prices for the relevant 
period. For the full sample, we reject the null hypothesis that the changes in the positions of both 
non-commercial and commercial firms do not forecast subsequent changes in prices, but we also 
reject the null hypothesis that changes in prices help to predict the changes in firms’ positions. 
Thus, the test for the full sample is inconclusive – the evidence suggests that the direction of 
predictability goes both ways. It is important to stress, however, that this rejection of the null 
hypothesis is highly sensitive to the lag-length specification and sensitive to the start date of the 
sample. For instance, using the Schwarz criterion and/or starting the sample in 1996 would result 
in non-rejection of this null hypothesis. By contrast, the finding of predictability from oil-price 
changes to non-commercial positions is robust across a variety of specifications and does not 
exhibit the same degree of sensitivity to specific choices of lag lengths. 
The most relevant period for this paper is from 2003 onward, when open interest began to 
increase in conjunction with oil prices, as shown in Figure 2. During this period, we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that changes in positions do not forecast changes in the price of oil. 
That is, there is no statistical evidence that changes in firms’ positions temporally preceded oil-
price increases during the period when speculative activity was thought to be an important driver 8 
 
of these price changes. But we are able to reject the null hypothesis that changes in the price of 
oil do not predict changes in the net positions of commercial and non-commercial firms. Thus, 
changes in positions do not predict oil-price changes, but changes in oil prices do predict changes 
in positions. These results are very similar to those reported by the Interagency Task Force on 
Commodity Markets (2008) and the IMF (2006, 2008). They are also consistent with the 
available evidence in agricultural commodity markets (Irwin and Sanders 2010). 
 
Of course, these tests omit many other possible drivers of traders’ positions that are observable at 
weekly frequency. For example, it is plausible that news about global demand for commodities 
drives both traders’ positions and oil prices, so that the correlation between the two variables is 
due to this unmodelled variable. High-frequency indicators of global demand are not readily 
available, but there are measures available at weekly frequency, such as the Baltic Dry Index. 
Similar indicators measured at monthly frequency have been used in the literature as proxies for 
demand pressures in international commodity markets (e.g., Kilian 2009). Using the Baltic Dry 



















Do price changes predict changes in net positions?  Yes Yes Yes 
Commercial  







Do price changes predict changes in net positions?  Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The change in price is the log change in the spot price of oil. The net positions of the commercial and non-commercial 
firms are defined as the net (long – short) open position. The null hypothesis is no Granger causality between the two variables. 
An entry of “Yes” indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at the 5 per cent significance level; an entry 
of “No” indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at the 5 per cent significance level. The number 
of lags in the Granger causality tests was chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
 
3.3  Non-commercial firms and market expectations 
The ability to hold oil inventories links the spot and futures markets, and this link implies that the 
effect of financial speculation, if any, should be reflected in the physical market for oil. The 
entry of non-commercial firms could have affected market expectations of future price increases, 
the incentive to store oil, and thus reduced the current quantity of oil available on the physical 
                                                            
8 The results of these regressions are available upon request. 9 
 
market. If the net long positions of the non-commercial firms had affected market expectations 
of the future spot price, proxied by the current futures price, financial speculation by non-
commercial firms would have created an incentive to accumulate oil inventories not justified by 
economic fundamentals. As Table 3 shows, however, non-commercial net open interest does not 
lead the futures-spot spread in either the full sample or the two subsamples.  
 















Do spreads predict changes in net positions?  Yes Yes  Yes 
Commercial  







Do spreads predict changes in net positions?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: See Table 1. “Spread” is the futures-spot spread and is defined as    
      s       , where    
     is the log futures price 
for delivery of oil in 12 months; s  is the log spot price of oil; and    is the yield of the 12-month U.S. Treasury bill. 
 
The available evidence on commercial stocks of oil also casts doubt on the proposition that non-
commercial firms distorted the incentive to store oil. In any commodity market, the ability to 
store the commodity ties together the spot and futures markets. Adjusted for storage and interest 
rate costs, persistently high futures prices relative to the current spot price give firms an incentive 
to accumulate inventories. Figure 5 shows that the global stock-to-production ratio declined 
during 2007/08. At the same time, the futures curve was downward-sloping, so that the futures-
spot spread was negative. If non-commercial firms had created expectations of persistently high 
prices, it would have been more natural to observe the accumulation of stocks and an upward-
sloping futures curve. Furthermore, in the United States, where the data on privately held stocks 
of oil are the most reliable, inventories of oil during the first half of 2008 were below those 
prevailing in 2005/07 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008; Smith 2009). To the extent 
that there are questions about the methods used to measure oil inventories in different OECD 
countries and the reliability of the aggregate series, the fact that we observed similar inventory 
behaviour in both the United States and the rest of the OECD lends credibility to this argument. 
 
Another way to store oil is by not extracting it, so it is also important to consider the possibility 
that financial speculation altered the incentive to supply oil. But the physical supply of oil does 
not exhibit any substantial decrease during the relevant period. Figure 6 shows that global oil 




Figure 5. OECD Stock-Production Ratio and 
Spot Price of Oil 
Figure 6. Global Oil Production and the Spot 
Price of Oil 
Sources: International Energy Agency and authors’ calculations 
 
Indeed, the high price of oil stimulated efforts to bring new oil wells on line (Figure 7). The pace 
of drilling for new oil wells accelerated in response to the increase in the price of oil in 2007/08, 
and did not abate until after the price reached its peak in July 2008 (Smith 2009). Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that the behaviour of non-commercial firms did not exert an effect on the 
incentive to accumulate oil stocks and thereby reduce the current supply of oil.  
 
Figure 7. Oil Rig Counts and the Price of Oil, 2000–10 
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4 Fundamental  Macroeconomic  Conditions Driving the Price of 
Crude Oil 
 
We next examine two explanations for the increase in the price of oil based on macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The first one attributes the surge in prices to the effect of historically low real 
interest rates on the demand for, and supply of, oil. The second explanation attributes the price 
increase to increases in demand related to the global business cycle. 
 
4.1  Real interest rates and the price of oil 
The first explanation attributes the increase in oil prices to the effect of historically low real 
interest rates on demand and supply conditions in the global oil market (Frankel and Rose 2009). 
Low real interest rates simultaneously increase the demand for storable commodities and 
decrease the supply through three main channels. First, low real interest rates increase the 
refiners’ incentive to carry inventories by reducing the opportunity cost of doing so. Second, they 
decrease the oil producers’ incentive to extract oil today by increasing the future value of oil 
deposits. Third, they encourage investors to shift investments out of the risk-free asset and to the 
spot market for commodities, increasing current demand for commodities.
9 
 
Despite the compelling economic logic of this reasoning, however, there is little evidence in 
favour of it. Frankel and Rose’s evidence indicates that both macroeconomic variables (e.g., 
global real activity) and microeconomic variables (e.g., inventories) play a role in determining 
commodity prices, but they do not find any evidence that the real interest rate accounts for the 
run-up in the price of oil, conditional on the other covariates.
10 This conclusion is independently 
corroborated by Anzuini, Lombardi and Pagano (2010), who use a different empirical 
specification to identify the effect of monetary policy shocks (that is, changes in the nominal 
interest rate rather than the real interest rate) on oil prices. This specification also admits the 
possibility that monetary policy shocks can affect commodity prices through indirect channels by 
stimulating aggregate demand (and, thus, the demand for commodities), as well as influencing 
the expected path of output growth and inflation. Their results indicate that negative interest rate 
                                                            
9 Another channel through which low real interest rates may affect oil prices is by increasing investment in oil 
production. This channel is suggested by the economics of oil production and structural models that include an oil-
producing sector (e.g., Lalonde and Muir 2007). For example, non-conventional production such as oil sands and 
deep-sea drilling, which have become increasingly important over the past decade, require considerable investment, 
so interest rates can be an important determinant of marginal cost. Although plausible, long lead times in expanding 
the existing supply of oil ensured that conditions remained tight during the 2003–08 period even when real interest 
rates were at low levels. On the tight supply conditions in the crude oil market during this period, see International 
Monetary Fund (2011).  
10 Summarizing their results, Frankel and Rose (2009, 24) state that “there was little support in these new annual 
results for the hypothesis that easy monetary policy and low real interest rates are an important source of upward 
pressure on real commodity prices, beyond any effect they might have via real economic activity and inflation.” 
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shocks account for only about 5 per cent of the variability in oil prices (Anzuini, Lombardi and 
Pagano 2010, Figure 3). 
 
4.2  Global demand and supply conditions 
The second explanation based on macroeconomic fundamentals attributes the increase in the 
price of oil to global stagnant supply conditions and large increases in demand from emerging-
market economies, which tend to have more energy-intensive production methods than OECD 
countries. On the demand side, the strong correlation between GDP growth in emerging-market 
economies and the recent oil-price spike has been widely documented. Kilian and Hicks (2009) 
document that news about global growth prospects, driven primarily by revisions to GDP growth 
in emerging Asia, accounts for much of the surge in the price of oil since 2003. In addition, 
Gervais, Kolet and Lalonde (2010) find that incorporating the share of emerging Asia in world 
GDP can account for movements in the price of energy commodities. Figure 8 shows that most 
of the increase in demand since 2006 has come from the emerging-market economies. 
 
On the supply side, conditions in the oil market during this period remained tight despite large 
investments in increasing capacity (Gervais and Kolet 2009). Figure 8 shows that global demand 
exceeded global supply in 2007 and the first half of 2008. This evidence lends credence to the 
argument that rapid increases in demand, in conjunction with a sluggish supply response, 
contributed to the run-up in the price of crude oil. 
 
Figure 8. Growth in Global Oil Demand (y/y) 
 

























































































































































To assess the plausibility of this explanation, Hamilton (2009) calculates whether the observed 
change in the price of oil is consistent with estimates of the short-run elasticity of the demand for 
oil. Such estimates indicate that the price elasticity of the demand for oil is small – around 0.05 
to 0.07 (Dahl 1993; Cooper 2003). That is, a 1 per cent increase in the price of crude oil results 
in a 0.05–0.07 per cent decrease in the quantity demanded. Hamilton uses an estimated elasticity 
of 0.06 to compute the price increase required to reconcile the increase in the demand for oil with 
the stagnant supply between 2005 and mid-2008, and finds that $142 per dollar is consistent with 
such an estimate.
11 But Hamilton’s case against financial speculation based on the elasticity of 
the demand for oil is highly sensitive to the precise value of the elasticity, which is difficult to 
identify and may vary over time (Baumeister and Peersman 2009). Conducting the same 
exercise, but assuming an elasticity of demand of 0.10, implies a price change from $55 per 
barrel to $100 per barrel – much lower than the price that we actually observed. 
 
Kilian and Murphy (2010) address some of the underlying econometric issues by explicitly 
incorporating oil inventories into a structural model of the global oil market. Their estimate of 
the short-run elasticity of the demand for oil is larger than that found in other studies: 0.44 rather 
than 0.06. On the other hand, they also find that the increase in the real price of oil between 2003 
and 2008 was driven by fluctuations in global demand conditions. Their analysis using this 
model suggests that, from 2003, the primary source of oil-price changes was the large and 
persistent demand shocks associated with positive shocks to global real activity.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The weight of the evidence indicates that macroeconomic fundamentals can explain the 2003–08 
increase in the price of oil. Financial speculation seems to have played a modest role. Our own 
analysis suggests that there is no empirical evidence to suggest a strong relationship between the 
positions of speculators and price changes. Although there is debate about the appropriate way to 
estimate demand and supply elasticities in the global crude oil market, this technical discussion 
should not distract us from the fact that global macroeconomic conditions are capable of 
accounting for the persistent increase in oil prices. Overall, the available evidence points to 
global demand and supply conditions rather than financial speculation as an explanation for the 
surge in the price of oil between 2003 and 2008. 
  
                                                            
11 The assumption behind the calculation is that, between 2005 and 2008H1, global demand for oil would have 
grown at the same rate as it did between 2003 and 2005 if the price of oil had remained at $55 per barrel. Using data 
on the global consumption of crude oil from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Hamilton estimates that 
demand in 2008H1 would have been 90.5 million barrels per day under that assumption, whereas the actual 
consumption was 85.5 million barrels per day. If the price elasticity of the demand for crude oil is 0.06, then the 
price of oil would have had to increase to $142 per barrel to clear the market. That is, 
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Appendix. Working’s (1960) T-Index 
Working’s T-index is an indicator intended to capture speculative pressure coming from non-
commercial firms. It is defined as 
  1 
  
       
              
  1 
  
       
             
where    is the open interest of speculators (non-commercial firms) who hold a net short 
position;    is the open interest of speculators who hold a net long position;    is the open 
interest of hedgers (commercial firms) who hold a net short position; and    is the open interest 
of hedgers who hold a net long position.  
 
The rationale underlying Working’s index of financial speculation is that speculators are 
necessary only insofar as they balance the market for hedgers. For example, if there are more 
short hedgers than long hedgers          , long speculators are required to make up the 
shortfall in long positions, meet the needs of hedgers and balance the market. The more short 
speculators present in the market, relative to the total number of hedgers, the more unbalanced 
the market and, hence, the more speculative pressure. 
 
To construct as long a time series as possible, we use the CFTC’s Commitment of Traders 
(COT) data, which are available from 1993 onwards. By contrast, Till (2009) uses the 
Disaggregated Commitment of Traders (DCOT) data that are available only through end-2006. 
The principal difference between our index and Till’s index is that Till defines hedgers as 
“Producers,” using the DCOT, whereas we use the broader “Commercial Traders” definition 
from the COT. The COT data also include positions for non-reportable traders, which we 
categorize as non-commercial traders in the calculation of the T-index. Despite these differences, 
the broad movements of the indexes are similar (Figure 9).   17 
 
Figure 9. Alternative Definitions of the T-Index 
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